Online supplementary materials for "How campaigns enhance European issues voting during

European Parliament elections"

S1: Descriptive statistics and representativeness

Table S1 present descriptive statistics, table S2 present a comparison between the sample and the voting age Danish population. The census data is drawn from Statistics Denmark.¹ As can be seen from table S2 the sample is slightly older and more highly educated than the population as a whole.

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	n
Pro-government attitudes	4.15	2.66	0.00	10.00	2310
Interest in politics	75.29	23.86	0.00	100.00	2310
Interest in EU politics	63.58	26.04	0.00	100.00	2310
Informed	90.50	18.78	0.00	100.00	2310
Knowledge: Patent court	75.54	36.22	0.00	100.00	1706
Pro-integration attitudes	4.69	2.43	0.00	10.00	2181
Integrationist voters	0.60	0.49	0.00	1.00	1642
Government voters	0.28	0.45	0.00	1.00	1573
Voted for Pro-EU party at last national election	0.54	0.50	0.00	1.00	2310
Voted for government party at last national election	0.31	0.46	0.00	1.00	2310
Ideology	4.03	2.79	-1.00	9.00	2173
National Economic Perceptions	0.55	0.21	0.00	1.00	2212
Male (ref: Male)	0.48	0.50	0.00	1.00	2310
Age in years	51.58	14.62	19.00	93.00	2310
Primary education	0.11	0.31	0.00	1.00	2310
Secondary school	0.07	0.26	0.00	1.00	2310
Vocational secondary school	0.04	0.19	0.00	1.00	2310
Vocational school	0.22	0.41	0.00	1.00	2310
Short tertiary education	0.11	0.31	0.00	1.00	2310
Long tertiary education	0.31	0.46	0.00	1.00	2310
Longer tertiary education	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00	2310
0 weeks out	0.14	0.34	0.00	1.00	2310
2 weeks out	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00	2310
4 weeks out	0.14	0.34	0.00	1.00	2310
6 weeks out	0.16	0.37	0.00	1.00	2310
8 weeks out	0.16	0.36	0.00	1.00	2310
10 weeks out	0.13	0.33	0.00	1.00	2310

¹ Percent in population calculated on the basis of Statistics Denmark. Database: FOLK1D from <u>www.statistikbanken.dk</u>. (3. quarter 2014). Accesed: 2017-1-20.

Region:	Percent in population	Percent in sample
0		-
Capital	30	33
Sealand	15	15
Southern Denmark	22	20
Mid-Jutland	23	21
North-Jutland	11	12
Gender:		
Men	49	52
Women	51	48
Age group:		
18-39 years old	32	22
40-59 years old	35	46
60+ years old	32	32
Education:		
Compulsory schooling	32	11
Lower secondary school	9	11
Vocational education	33	22
Short-term tertiary	5	11
Medium-term tertiary	15	31
Long-term tertiary	7	15

Table S2: Respondents across region, gender, age group and education compared to distribution among Danish voting age population

n=2,310 for second column.

S2: Some additional results

Figure S1 present the average marginal effects related to ideology described in the section "Discussion of the Results" in the main article. As can be seen from figure S1, the average marginal effect of ideology is slightly negative across all waves in the model predicting votes for the governing party, for the model predicting votes for pro-EU party ideology is about zero across the different waves. What does this tell us? It tells us that voters do not become more issue oriented in general during campaings for the European parliament. Only EU issue voting seems to increase.

On a technical note, it is important to realize that we omit the interactions between integration attitudes, government evaluation and campaign progression. As such, there is only one interaction in each of the estimated models – those between ideology and campaign progression.

The reason for omitting the original interactions is principally due to estimation efficiency. If we included them, we would need to have two attitudinal variables interaction with the weeks until election variable.




Figure S1: Average marginal effect of pro-integration attitudes and pro-government attitudes with 90 pct. confidence intervals. See replication materials for estimation details.

Figure S2 presents the average marginal effects related to national economic perceptions described in the section "Discussion of the Results" in the main article. As can be seen from figure S2, the effect of economic evaluations becomes smaller as the campaign commences, and is virtually non-existent in the final week of the campaign. A test of equality of the marginal effects reveal that the changes are statistically significant ($\chi^2(3) = 34.17$, p< 0.01). This tells us that the decrease in importance of national factors, which we hypothesized above, is not limited to any one factor. Not only beliefs about the quality of the national government, but also beliefs about the national economy, becomes less important as election day grows closer.




Figure S2: Average marginal effect of evaluation of the national economy with 90 pct. confidence intervals. See replication materials for estimation details.