

Online Appendix for “How Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable for Personal Welfare? Evidence of a Self-Serving Bias”. *The Journal of Politics*.

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A Surveys Included in Study 1

Election surveys from the US: 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012. For details, see: http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/anes_timeseries_cdf/anes_timeseries_cdf.htm

Election surveys from the UK: 2001, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2017. For details, see: <https://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/cross-sectional-data/>

Election surveys from Denmark: 1990, 1994, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011 and 2015. For details, see <http://www.valgprojektet.dk/default.asp?l=eng>.

Election surveys from Australia: 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013 and 2016. For details, see <https://australianelectionstudy.org/voter-studies/>.

Election surveys in the Latinobarómetro: Table A1 shows the countries included in the Latinobarómetro and the number of years that these countries have been surveyed. For details, see: <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp>

Table A1: List of included surveys from the Latinobarómetro

Country	First year	Last year
Argentina	1995	2010
Bolivia	1996	2010
Brazil	1995	2010
Chile	1995	2010
Colombia	1996	2010
Costa Rica	1996	2010
Dominican Republic	2004	2010
Ecuador	1996	2010
El Salvador	1996	2010
Guatemala	1996	2010
Honduras	1996	2010
Mexico	1995	2010
Nicaragua	1996	2010
Panama	1996	2010
Paraguay	1995	2010
Peru	1995	2010
Spain	1996	2010
Uruguay	1995	2010
Venezuela	1995	2010

B Variable Descriptions and Descriptive Statistics

The ANES uses the following question with answers falling in one of the three categories “better,” “worse,” and “the same”:

- Country: “Would you say that over the past year the nation’s economy has gotten better, stayed about the same or gotten worse?”
- Own: “We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. Would you say that you and your family living here are better off or worse off financially than you were a year ago?”

The BES used the following questions, with answers falling in one of the five categories “got a little better,” “got a lot better,” “got a little worse,” “got a lot worse,” and “stayed the same”:

- Country: “How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months?”
- Own: “How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 12 months ago?”

The DNES used the following questions, with answers falling in one of the five categories “better,” “a lot better,” “worse,” “a lot worse,” and “the same”:

- Country: “How is the economic situation in Denmark today compared to one year ago?”
- Own: “How is your and your family’s economic situation today compared to one year ago?”

The AusES used the following questions, with answers falling in one of the five categories “got a little better,” “got a lot better,” “got a little worse,” “got a lot worse,” and “about the same”:

- Country: “How does the general economic situation now compare with what it was 12 months ago?”
- Own: “How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 12 months ago?”

In some more recent surveys the question about the country’s economy is “How does the general economic situation in Australia now compare with what it was 12 months ago?”.

The DK-OPT survey from study 2 used the following questions, with answers falling in one of the five categories “better,” “a lot better,” “worse,” “a lot worse,” and “the same”:

- Country: “How is the economic situation in Denmark today compared to one year ago?”

- Own: “How is your and your family’s economic situation today compared to one year ago?”

The Latinobarometro has used two set of questions for the economic perceptions questions. From 1995-2000, the following questions were used:

- Country: “Do you consider the current economic situation of the country to be better, about the same, or worse than 12 months ago?”
- Own: “Do you consider your economic situation and that of your family to be better, about the same, or worse than 12 months ago?”

From 2001— the following questions were used:

- Country: “Do you consider the current economic situation of the country to be much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse, or much worse than 12 months ago?”
- Own: “Do you consider your economic situation and that of your family to be much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse, or much worse than 12 months ago?”

Controls: *Education* is measured using a dummy indicating whether the respondent reported having attended college/university (including nursing and teaching certificates in the UK). Ideology is measured on a scale from left (0 or 1) to right (10) in the the BES, the DNES, the AusES and the Latinobarómetro. In the ANES, ideology is measured on a 7-point scale going from “extremely liberal” to “extremely conservative.” Those who refused to answer or answered don’t know to the question about ideology were placed at the midpoint of the scale. *Gender* is coded 1 for female and 0 for male. *Age* is measured in years.

Tables C1-C8 present descriptive statistics from the election studies, the survey on attributions and the survey experiments.

Table B1: Descriptive statistics, ANES

	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max	n
Vote for presidential party	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.00	12252
Ideology	4.00	1.35	1.00	4.00	7.00	12252
State of personal economy	1.18	0.80	0.00	1.00	2.00	12252
State of country’s economy	0.97	0.78	0.00	1.00	2.00	12252
Some college	0.63	0.48	0.00	1.00	1.00	12252
Age	49.09	16.76	17.00	49.00	93.00	12252
Woman (ref: man)	0.54	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.00	12252

Table B2: Descriptive statistics, BES

	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max	n
Vote for party in government	0.41	0.49	0.00	0.00	1.00	5873
Vote for prime minister party	0.38	0.49	0.00	0.00	1.00	5873
Ideology	4.89	1.99	0.00	5.00	10.00	5873
State of personal economy	0.73	0.79	0.00	1.00	2.00	5873
State of country's economy	0.96	0.75	0.00	1.00	2.00	5873
Some college	0.37	0.48	0.00	0.00	1.00	5873
Age	52.81	16.81	18.00	53.00	99.00	5873
Woman (ref: man)	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.00	5873

Table B3: Descriptive statistics, DNES

	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max	n
Vote for party in government	0.34	0.47	0.00	0.00	1.00	12391
Vote for prime minister party	0.26	0.44	0.00	0.00	1.00	12391
Ideology	5.23	2.42	0.00	5.00	10.00	12391
State of personal economy	0.88	0.91	0.00	1.00	2.00	12391
State of country's economy	1.20	0.85	0.00	1.00	2.00	12391
Some college	0.33	0.47	0.00	0.00	1.00	12391
Age	48.32	16.98	16.00	47.00	102.00	12391
Woman (ref: man)	0.47	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	12391

Table B4: Descriptive statistics, AusES

	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max	n
Vote for party in government	0.43	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	15904
Vote for prime minister party	0.41	0.49	0.00	0.00	1.00	15904
Ideology	4.78	2.02	0.00	5.00	10.00	15904
State of personal economy	0.75	0.76	0.00	1.00	2.00	15904
State of country's economy	0.90	0.73	0.00	1.00	2.00	15904
Some college	0.45	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	15904
Age	49.18	16.43	18.00	49.00	102.00	15904
Woman (ref: man)	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.00	15904

Table B5: Descriptive statistics, Latinobarometro

	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max	n
Approve of president	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.00	112096
Ideology	5.35	2.77	0.00	5.00	10.00	112096
State of personal economy	0.87	0.86	0.00	1.00	2.00	112096
State of country's economy	0.91	0.78	0.00	1.00	2.00	112096
Some university	0.07	0.25	0.00	0.00	1.00	112096
Age	38.92	16.07	16.00	36.00	99.00	112096
Woman (ref: man)	0.49	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	112096

Table B6: Descriptive statistics, DK-OPT survey

	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max	n
Government responsible for national economy	0.77	0.24	0.00	0.75	1.00	943
Government responsible for repondent's economy	0.72	0.29	0.00	0.75	1.00	943
State of personal economy	2.13	0.79	0.00	2.00	4.00	943
State of country's economy	2.49	0.74	0.00	3.00	4.00	943
Some college	0.48	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	943
Age	52.68	17.49	19.00	55.00	97.00	943
Woman (ref: man)	0.48	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	943

Table B7: Descriptive statistics, Experiment 1–2

	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max	n
Responsibility housing	0.48	0.25	0.00	0.50	1.00	4016
Responsibility employment	0.45	0.29	0.00	0.50	1.00	4016
Exp. 2	0.75	0.43	0.00	1.00	1.00	4016

Table B8: Descriptive statistics, Experiment 3

	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max	n
Personal responsibility	0.43	0.27	0.00	0.44	1.00	1009
Government responsibility	0.44	0.25	0.00	0.44	1.00	1007

C Analyses Using Prime Minister Parties

The analyses of the AuSES, the BES, and the DNES used support for all governing parties as the dependent variable, yet some argue that it is primarily the Prime Minister party which is punished and rewarded for the state of the economy in parliamentary democracies (e.g., Duch and Stevenson, 2008). Figure C1 compares estimates of the valence asymmetry from analyses using only governing parties and only the prime minister party as the dependent variable. The results are quite similar across both types of analyses, although the estimated valence asymmetry from the DNES is somewhat smaller and no longer significantly different from zero.




Figure C1: Estimated valence asymmetries for different dependent variables. Based on models which include controls (i.e., gender, age, education and ideology). Horizontal lines are 95 pct. (thin) and 90 pct. (thick) confidence intervals.

D Logistic Regressions

Tables D1, E2, D3, E4 and D5 present logistic regressions using the same dependent and independent variables as the LPMs used to produce the main results in Study 1. The results of these analyses are similar to those found in Study 1. In particular, the estimated logit coefficients suggest that the effect of being worse off is larger than the effect of being better off for personal economic conditions. There is no similar valence asymmetry in the effect of national economic conditions.

Table D1: Logistic regression of voting for party in government (ANES)

	(1)	(2)
Worse off - own economy	-0.51*	-0.47*
	(0.06)	(0.07)
Better off - own economy	0.27*	0.30*
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Worse off - national economy	-1.12*	-0.94*
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Better off - own economy	1.37*	1.22*
	(0.06)	(0.07)
Female (ref:male)		0.16*
		(0.05)
Some college ore more (ref: none)		-0.08
		(0.05)
Ideology		1.03*
		(0.03)
Age		0.00
		(0.00)
Pseudo R ²	0.18	0.34
Observations	12,252	12,252

Standard errors in parentheses

Dummies for election surveys included in all models.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table D2: Logistic regression of voting for party in government (BES)

	(1)	(2)
Worse off - own economy	-0.49*	-0.39*
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Better off - own economy	0.07	0.16*
	(0.07)	(0.08)
Worse off - national economy	-0.82*	-0.68*
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Better off - own economy	0.63*	0.55*
	(0.07)	(0.08)
Female (ref: male)		0.11 ⁺
		(0.06)
Some college ore more (ref: none)		-0.21*
		(0.06)
Ideology		0.49*
		(0.02)
Age		0.01*
		(0.00)
Pseudo R ²	0.08	0.19
Observations	5,873	5,873

Standard errors in parentheses

Dummies for election surveys included in all models.

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table D3: Logistic regression of voting for party in government (DNES)

	(1)	(2)
Worse off - own economy	-0.26*	-0.19*
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Better off - own economy	-0.04	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Worse off - national economy	-0.61*	-0.65*
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Better off - own economy	0.81*	0.78*
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Female (ref: male)		0.08*
		(0.04)
Age		0.01*
		(0.00)
Some college ore more (ref: none)		-0.18*
		(0.04)
Ideology		0.15*
		(0.01)
Pseudo R ²	0.04	0.08
Observations	12,391	12,391

Standard errors in parentheses

Dummies for election surveys included in all models.

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table D4: Logistic regression of voting for party in government (AusES)

	(1)	(2)
Worse off - own economy	-0.41*	-0.41*
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Better off - own economy	0.09 ⁺	0.13*
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Worse off - national economy	-0.76*	-0.73*
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Better off - own economy	0.81*	0.72*
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Female (ref:male)		-0.07 ⁺
		(0.04)
Some college ore more (ref: none)		-0.25*
		(0.04)
Ideology		0.42*
		(0.01)
Age		0.01*
		(0.00)
Pseudo R ²	0.09	0.18
Observations	15,904	15,904

Standard errors in parentheses
Dummies for election surveys included in all models.
⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table D5: Logistic regression of voting for party in government (Latinobar.)

	(1)	(2)
Worse off - own economy	-0.28*	-0.29*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Better off - own economy	0.20*	0.22*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Worse off - national economy	-0.61*	-0.63*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Better off - own economy	0.71*	0.71*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female (ref:male)		0.01
		(0.01)
Some college ore more (ref: none)		-0.20*
		(0.03)
Age		0.01*
		(0.00)
Ideology		0.03*
		(0.00)
Pseudo R ²	0.19	0.19
Observations	112,096	112,096

Standard errors in parentheses
Dummies for election surveys included in all models.
⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

E Interaction Models

Tables E1, E2, E3, E4 and E5 present models interacting voters perception of their personal finances and their country's economy for each of the five election studies. I code the 3-point national and personal economic perceptions variables so that -1 means that the respondent believes the economic situation is doing worse, 0 means that respondent believes the economic situation is unchanged, and 1 means that they believe it is doing better. I estimate the interaction effect of personal and national economic perceptions using a set of LPM models with and without controls for each of the different election studies.

The interaction effect is only statistically significant in the DNES. There is no significant interaction effect in the remaining four election studies. This suggests that it is probably reasonable to estimate the effects of national and personal economic conditions as independent of each other.

Table E1: Interaction model of voting for party in government (ANES)

	(1)	(2)
Own Econmy	0.08*	0.06*
	(0.01)	(0.00)
National economy	0.26*	0.18*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Interaction	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female (ref:male)		0.02*
		(0.01)
Some college ore more (ref: none)		-0.02*
		(0.01)
Age		0.00
		(0.00)
Ideology		0.15*
		(0.00)
σ	0.44	0.40
R ²	0.23	0.37
Observations	12,252	12,252

Standard errors in parentheses

Dummies for election surveys included in all models.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table E2: Interaction model of voting for party in government (BES)

	(1)	(2)
Own Econmy	0.06*	0.05*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
National economy	0.17*	0.12*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Interaction	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female (ref: male)		0.02 ⁺
		(0.01)
Some college ore more (ref: none)		-0.04*
		(0.01)
Ideology		0.09*
		(0.00)
σ	0.46	0.43
R ²	0.10	0.23
Observations	5,873	5,873

Standard errors in parentheses

Dummies for election surveys included in all models.

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table E3: Interaction model of voting for party in government (DNES)

	(1)	(2)
Own Econmy	0.01*	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
National economy	0.15*	0.14*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Interaction	0.02*	0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female (ref: male)		0.02*
		(0.01)
Age		0.00*
		(0.00)
Some college ore more (ref: none)		-0.04*
		(0.01)
Ideology		0.03*
		(0.00)
σ	0.46	0.45
R ²	0.05	0.09
Observations	12,391	12,391

Standard errors in parentheses

Dummies for election surveys included in all models.

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table E4: Interaction model of voting for party in government (AusES)

	(1)	(2)
Own Econmy	0.06*	0.06*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
National economy	0.18*	0.15*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Interaction	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female (ref:male)		-0.01 ⁺
		(0.01)
Some college ore more (ref: none)		-0.05*
		(0.01)
Ideology		0.08*
		(0.00)
Age		0.00*
		(0.00)
σ	0.47	0.44
R ²	0.12	0.22
Observations	15,904	15,904

Standard errors in parentheses

Dummies for election surveys included in all models.

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table E5: Interaction model of voting for party in government (Latinobar.)

	(1)	(2)
Own Econmy	0.05*	0.05*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
National economy	0.13*	0.13*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Interaction	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female (ref:male)		0.00
		(0.00)
Age		0.00*
		(0.00)
Some college ore more (ref: none)		-0.04*
		(0.01)
Ideology		0.01*
		(0.00)
σ	0.44	0.44
R ²	0.24	0.24
Observations	112,096	112,096

Standard errors in parentheses

Dummies for election surveys included in all models.

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

F Estimating the Valence Asymmetry

The model used to analyze the election studies can be written as

$$Pr(y_{it} = 1) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 natwor_{it} + \beta_2 natbet_{it} + \beta_3 perwor_{it} + \beta_4 perbet_{it} + \epsilon_{it}. \quad (1)$$

Here, y is the dependent variable, support for the incumbent, $natwor$ and $natbet$ are dummies indicating whether the respondent believes the national economy is doing better or worse, $perwor$ and $perbet$ are dummies indicating whether the respondent believes their personal finances are doing better or worse, and ϵ_{it} is the error term.

When estimating the valence asymmetry I am interested in how much larger the negative “worse” effect is than the positive “better” effect. In terms of Model 1 the relevant valence asymmetries can be defined as $\beta_1 + \beta_2 = \theta_n$ and $\beta_3 + \beta_4 = \theta_p$, where a negative θ implies that the negative “worse” effect is larger than the positive “better” effect. (Note that I divide θ_p and θ_n by -1 when reporting them in Study 1, meaning that positive values come to represent that the negative effect is larger than the positive effect.)

θ_n , the valence asymmetry for the national economy, and θ_p , the valence asymmetry for the personal economy, are not estimated directly in Model 1. Instead, I estimate a slightly modified version of Model 1. In particular, I incorporate θ_p and θ_n into the models by decomposing the “worse” effect into the valence asymmetry (θ) and the “better” effect (β_2 for national and β_4 for personal economic conditions),

$$Pr(y_{it} = 1) = \beta_0 + (\theta_n - \beta_2)natwor_{it} + \beta_2 natbet_{it} + (\theta_p - \beta_4)perwor_{it} + \beta_4 perbet_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \quad (2)$$

which can be rearranged as

$$Pr(y_{it} = 1) = \beta_0 + \theta_n natwor_{it} + \beta_2 (natbet_{it} - natwor_{it}) + \theta_p perwor_{it} + \beta_4 (perbet_{it} - perwor_{it}) + \epsilon_{it}. \quad (3)$$

This linear probability model includes θ_p and θ_n directly, and it can be estimated by creating new variables for national and personal economic perceptions that subtract the “worse” dummies from the “better” dummies. A linear probability model like this one is used to estimate valence asymmetries in Study 1.

G Tables Underlying Figures 1-5

Tables G1, G2, G3, G4 and G5 present the OLS regression models used to produce Figure 1 and 2. Tables G6, G7, G8, and G9 present the OLS regression models used to produce figures 3, 4 and 5.

Table G1: OLS regression of voting for party in government (ANES)

	(1)	(2)
Worse off - own economy	-0.10*	-0.07*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Better off - own economy	0.05*	0.05*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Worse off - national economy	-0.26*	-0.18*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Better off - own economy	0.27*	0.18*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female (ref:male)		0.02*
		(0.01)
Age		0.00
		(0.00)
Some college ore more (ref: none)		-0.02*
		(0.01)
Ideology		0.15*
		(0.00)
σ	0.44	0.40
R ²	0.23	0.37
Observations	12,252	12,252

Standard errors in parentheses

Dummies for election surveys included in all models.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table G2: OLS regression of voting for party in government (BES)

	(1)	(2)
Worse off - own economy	-0.10*	-0.07*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Better off - own economy	0.02	0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Worse off - national economy	-0.18*	-0.13*
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Better off - own economy	0.15*	0.12*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female (ref: male)		0.02
		(0.01)
Some college ore more (ref: none)		-0.04*
		(0.01)
Age		0.00*
		(0.00)
Ideology		0.09*
		(0.00)
σ	0.46	0.43
R ²	0.11	0.23
Observations	5,873	5,873

Standard errors in parentheses

Dummies for election surveys included in all models.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table G3: OLS regression of voting for party in government (DNES)

	(1)	(2)
Worse off - own economy	-0.05*	-0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Better off - own economy	-0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Worse off - national economy	-0.11*	-0.11*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Better off - own economy	0.18*	0.16*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female (ref: male)		0.02*
		(0.01)
Age		0.00*
		(0.00)
Some college ore more (ref: none)		-0.04*
		(0.01)
Ideology		0.03*
		(0.00)
σ	0.46	0.45
R ²	0.06	0.09
Observations	12,391	12,391

Standard errors in parentheses

Dummies for election surveys included in all models.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table G4: OLS regression of voting for party in government (AusES)

	(1)	(2)
Worse off - own economy	-0.09*	-0.08*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Better off - own economy	0.02 ⁺	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Worse off - national economy	-0.17*	-0.14*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Better off - own economy	0.19*	0.15*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female (ref: male)		-0.01 ⁺
		(0.01)
Some college ore more (ref: none)		-0.05*
		(0.01)
Ideology		0.08*
		(0.00)
Age		0.00*
		(0.00)
σ	0.46	0.44
R ²	0.12	0.22
Observations	15,904	15,904

Standard errors in parentheses

Dummies for election surveys included in all models.

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table G5: OLS regression of voting for party in government (Latinobar.)

	(1)	(2)
Worse off - own economy	-0.06*	-0.06*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Better off - own economy	0.04*	0.04*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Worse off - national economy	-0.13*	-0.13*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Better off - own economy	0.13*	0.13*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female (ref: male)		0.00
		(0.00)
Age		0.00*
		(0.00)
Some college ore more (ref: none)		-0.04*
		(0.01)
Ideology		0.01*
		(0.00)
σ	0.44	0.44
R ²	0.24	0.24
Observations	112,096	112,096

Standard errors in parentheses

Dummies for election surveys included in all models.

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table G6: OLS regression of beliefs about government’s capacity to affect national and personal economic conditions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Personal	National	Personal	National
State of personal economy	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)		
State of country’s economy	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Woman (ref: man)	-0.03+ (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.03+ (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)
Age	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Some college	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Worse (ref: A Lot Worse)			-0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)
The Same			-0.07 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)
Better			-0.09+ (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
A Lot Better			-0.13* (0.06)	-0.01 (0.05)
Constant	0.87* (0.05)	0.83* (0.04)	0.87* (0.06)	0.84* (0.06)
σ	0.29	0.24	0.29	0.24
R ²	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02
Observations	943	943	943	943

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table G7: Experiments 1 and 2; how responsible is the government for housing?

	Exp. 1	Exp. 2	Pooled
Worse - Own	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04* (0.01)	-0.04* (0.01)
Better - Own	-0.09* (0.03)	-0.09* (0.01)	-0.09* (0.01)
Same - National	-0.01 (0.03)	0.03* (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)
Worse - National	-0.05+ (0.03)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.01)
Better - National	-0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Exp. 2			-0.00 (0.01)
Constant	0.52* (0.02)	0.50* (0.01)	0.51* (0.01)
σ	0.24	0.25	0.25
R ²	0.01	0.03	0.02
Observations	1,002	3,014	4,016

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table G8: Experiments 1 and 2; how responsible is the government for employment?

	Exp. 1	Exp. 2	Pooled
Worse - Own	0.04 (0.03)	0.06* (0.01)	0.06* (0.01)
Better - Own	-0.16* (0.03)	-0.13* (0.01)	-0.14* (0.01)
Same - National	0.16* (0.02)	0.29* (0.02)	0.25* (0.01)
Worse - National	0.11* (0.02)	0.19* (0.02)	0.17* (0.01)
Better - National	0.17* (0.02)	0.29* (0.02)	0.26* (0.01)
Exp. 2			-0.05* (0.01)
Constant	0.47* (0.02)	0.35* (0.01)	0.42* (0.01)
σ	0.23	0.25	0.25
R ²	0.19	0.27	0.26
Observations	1,002	3,014	4,016

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Table G9: Experiment 3 - how responsible is...?

	Voters themselves	Government
Negative change (ref: positive)	-0.11* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)
Constant	0.48* (0.01)	0.46* (0.01)
σ	0.26	0.25
R ²	0.04	0.01
Observations	1,009	1,007


Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

H The Neutral Category

The first two survey experiments included a neutral category asking respondent how responsible the government would be for either the positive or the negative outcome (e.g., “imagine that the price of housing in the country as a whole increases or decreases”). The results for the neutral category do not have any clear implications for the self-serving bias, which is why they were not presented in the main article, but they are presented in Figure H1 for transparency.

Personal Outcomes



National Outcomes




Figure H1: Results from the first two survey experiments including the neutral category. Dots represent average responses for each outcome. The smaller dots represent results from the original (circles) and the replication (diamonds) separately. The larger dots represent pooled results. Vertical lines are 95 pct. (thin) and 90 pct. (thick) confidence intervals. There is at least 830 observation in each treatment condition for personal outcomes and at least 505 observations in each treatment condition for the national outcomes.

References

Duch, Raymond M and Randolph T Stevenson. 2008. *The economic vote: how political and economic institutions condition election results, Political economy of institutions and decisions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.